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Abstract. This article describes the positive and negative consequences for national security of the
ontology and phenomenology of multiple selves.
The academic and applied disciplines of political psychology are predicated on the hypothesis that
human psychology has consequences for political behavior. This hypothesis is variously termed obvious
through the equating of psychology and behavior; nonsensical through the reifying of a material,
objective world over a mental, subjective world; or simplistic in the context of reciprocal synergy
between and among that which is psychological and that which is political. But the hypothesis remains.
One basic variant of the hypothesis focuses on the impact of self-psychology on the security aspects of
politics. Theoretical and empirical data related to this impact suggest no simple conclusion. For
example, Sherman and Cohen (2002) studied the role of the self on the phenomenon of resisting
evidence that challenges the validity of long-held belief. This phenomenon can be exemplified by
political policymakers who refuse to change tack in the face of disconfirming—even seemingly
overwhelming—intelligence. And this refusal to change can cover not only opinions, attitudes, and
beliefs, but also behaviors stemming from them and further reinforcing them.
Sherman and Cohen (2002) argue that resistance to disconfirming evidence can be a defensive tendency
to protect the perceived worth and integrity of the self. In other words, a concatenation of opinions,
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors are integral enough to the self so that jettisoning that concatenation
risks jettisoning the self. While the degree to which this defensive maneuver may be based on aspects
of consciousness and unconsciousness is debatable, a resistant individual might well be excused for at
least incipient ambivalence towards destroying the self in the service of one’s country—especially in a
security context that can contain elements of corruption, hidden agendas, self-serving tactics and
strategies, and irrationality among security practitioners.
But there can be a way out. Sherman and Cohen (2002) posit that individuals can “respond to
information in a less defensive and more open-minded manner when their self-worth is buttressed by
an affirmation of an alternative source of identity.” These researchers go on to write “self-affirmed
individuals are more likely to accept information that they would otherwise view as threatening, and
subsequently to change their beliefs and even their behavior in a desirable fashion.” A conclusion with
security import would then be that alternative sources of identity—a version of which would be
multiples identities or selves—have a positive impact on best utilizing accurate intelligence for security
decision making.
However, that alternative sources of identity may have positive security impact is contraindicated by a
common response set manifested by personnel security authorities. For example, the Director of
Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/9 may be viewed as a collection of guidelines for collecting
information in the service of constructing an hypothesized self of an individual being considered for the
awarding or maintaining of a high-level security clearance, special access to information, or a sensitive
position. The personnel security adjudicator is tasked with integrating the information collected by
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investigators and from databases in the construction of an hypothesized self—except in cases wherein
the identification of proscribed behavior automatically elicits closure of adjudication and a denial of
clearance, access, or position. The notion that the individual to be adjudicated may have alternative
sources of identity or multiple selves—some of which may be based on the same information collected
by investigators and from databases—can be a threatening one to the adjudicator. Besides the
identification of multiple selves, the consideration of which are prepotent and when can be so difficult
that it might contribute to the very rejection of a commensurate theory of human personality to the
detriment of a personnel security program.
Multiple selves may have security implications in yet other ways. Suh (2002) has posited that the
consistency among multiple selves is positively correlated with psychological well-being that is
presumably positively correlated with satisfactory security functioning. Suh’s contention is supported in
a discussion differentiating dissociative from associative personality disorders by Oppenheimer (2002)
who notes that “cognitive complexity of the neurological system may be an endogenous factor affecting
the occurrence of associative disorders and…failing association.” In other words, association, if not
actual consistency, may be crucial to multiple selves avoiding the shoals of psychopathology. Finally,
multiple selves as semi-fictional narratives (Brown, 2001), socially conditioned subjugating discourses
(Wood & Roche, 2001), and as virtual selves (cf. Kunkle. 2002) merit systematic exploration for security
impact.
Multiple selves very profitably serves as a vehicle for remaining humble about the person as persons in
political psychology. (See Brown, M.T. (2001). Multiple personality and personal identity. Philosophical
Psychology, 14 435-447; Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/9. (November 18, 2002).
Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities.
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/dcid6-9.htm; Kunkle, S. (2000). Hollow subjects in a headless world.
Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture & Society, , 301-311; Sherman, D. K.; & Cohen, G. L. (2002).
Accepting threatening information: Self-affirmation and the reduction of defensive biases. Current
Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 119-123; Suh, E.M. (2002). Culture, identity consistency, and
subjective well-being. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 83, 1378-1391; Wood, G. G., & Roche,
S. E. (2001). Situations and representations: Feminist practice with survivors of male violence. Families
in Society, 82, 583-590.) (Keywords: Multiple Selves, Security)

2
https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol14/iss17/3

2

